Endless wrangles in Kenya’s collective management system have made us all experts in copyright law. The thorny question of how and to what extent key players in the collective administration of copyright and related rights must comply with the Constitution remains a hotly debated topic. This brings us to a recent judgment by the High Court in the case of Laban Toto Juma & 4 Others v. Kenya Copyright Board & 2 Others Consolidated Kakamega Petition No. 3B of 2017 delivered on 13 July 2018. A copy of this High Court judgment is available here. Not surprisingly, both sides in this see-saw legal battle are claiming victory following the court’s final verdict. So, this blogpost will attempt to examine the key issues tackled by the court in its judgment as well as some of the questions that have been left unanswered.
In the recent High Court case of ABSA Kenya Limited v Barclays Bank of Kenya  eKLR, a Kenyan company has failed to temporarily halt the proposed name change of Barclays Bank to Absa. ABSA Kenya claimed that it had received cancellation of lucrative transactions due to confusion created by the planned rebranding by Barclays Bank. However the learned judge in this case dismissed the plaintiff’s application for interim injunction to ‘restrain Barclays from using, representing, infringing, advertising or in any manner whatever the trade mark and the name ABSA or its derivatives, deductives, corollaries devices and/or anxilliaries in Kenya or in any other place or at all.’
In a recently reported ruling in the case of LRC Products Limited v Metro Pharmaceuticals Limited  eKLR, the High Court dismissed an application by the plaintiff for an injunction restraining the defendant from importing, packaging, supplying, selling or offering for sell, distributing or otherwise dealing with the ‘Durex” products. The plaintiff had also sought orders to enter into the Defendant’s premises and seize all products or packaged products bearing the Plaintiff’s trademark, or similar trademark and further, seize records of purchases and sales, invoices and any other documents which constitute or would constitute evidence necessary to substantiate its cause of action.
As a result of this ruling, a trade mark will not be infringed by the importation into or distribution, sale or offering for sale, in Kenya of goods to which the trade mark has been applied by or with the consent of the proprietor.
“The appellant cannot have been credited for singing and performing well, as a choir. He was not the choir. He was the Director, the Conductor or the Instructor. Therefore, when the prowess of the Appellant was recognised for the tasks he had excelled in, that did not, and could not transfer to the Appellant, the intellectual property which vested in the choir.” – Mr. Justice Fred A. Ochieng, Misc. Cause No. 193/2015 Joseph Muyale Inzai v Henry Wanjala, Sylvester Matete Makobi, Cliff Njora Njuguna,Masambaya Fredrick Ndukwe And Geoffrey Sauke Together T/A Kenya Boys Choir & another 
In a recent judgment, the High Court has upheld the ruling of the Registrar of Trade Marks to expunge Trade Mark No. KE/T/2010/67586 “KENYA BOYS CHOIR” (WORDS) in Classes 16 and 41 in the name of Joseph Muyale Inzai. From previous posts here and here, readers will recall that members of Kenyan Boys Choir filed an application with the Registrar for expungement of the mark claiming that they were aggrieved by its entry in the Register for various reasons. The Registrar ruled in favour of the Choir members and found that Inzai had no valid and legal claim to the mark for the reason that his ownership of the mark was not sufficiently substantiated as required by law. Inzai felt aggrieved by the Registrar’s ruling and moved to the High Court on an appeal. This blogpost is in relation to the High Court judgment in that appeal.
This blogger has come across a recent ruling by Uganda’s Court of Appeal in the case of Wananchi Group (U) Ltd v. The New Vision Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd. The background of this case is as follows: New Vision had filed an application against Wananchi in the High Court for a temporary injunction seeking to restrain the Wananchi from further infringement of the New Vision’s copyright in the production, air transmission or broadcast of “Bukedde Television” through Wananchi’s Zuku Television.
In the High Court, New Vision contended that Wananchi continued to infringe on the New Vision’s copyright by retransmitting Bukedde TV for private benefit and for personal economic gain without the consent or licence of the owner despite express warning. The High Court agreed with New Vision and granted the order of a temporary injunction. This brings us to the present case of Wananchi’s application in Court of Appeal for an interim order of stay of execution of the order of the lower court.
This blogger has recently come across Nairobi High Court Civil Case No. 262 of 2015 Irene Mutisya & Anor v. Music Copyright Society of Kenya & Anor. In this case Mutisya and another copyright owner Masivo have filed suit against Music Copyright Society of Kenya (MCSK) and mobile network operator Safaricom Limited for copyright infringement. The copyright owners filed an urgent application on 30th July 2015 for a temporary injunction to restrain Safaricom from remitting license fees to MCSK pursuant to a recently concluded license agreement for caller ring-back tones (CRBT) made available through Safaricom’s Skiza platform. The copyright owners also asked the court to restrain both Safaricom and MCSK from implementing the CRBT License Agreement pending the hearing of the application.
Editor’s Note: On 31st July 2015, the urgent application in this Petition No.317 of 2015 dated 29th July 2015 was heard and certain interim orders were granted. A copy of the orders is available here.
This blogger has confirmed a recent media report that two content service providers and three copyright owners have jointly filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of the right to equitable remuneration under the now infamous section 30A of the Copyright Act. The Petition was filed against the Attorney General, Kenya Copyright Board (KECOBO), Kenya Association of Music Producers (KAMP), Performers Rights Society of Kenya (PRiSK) and Music Copyright Society of Kenya (MCSK).
As stated above, the crux of the Petition filed by Xpedia Management Limited, Liberty Afrika Technologies Limited, Elijah Mira, Francis Jumba and Carolyne Ndiba is that KAMP, PRiSK and MCSK should be stopped by the court from receiving or collecting royalties under section 30A of the Copyright Act in respect of works owned or claimed by the Petitioners.
Previously, this blogger discussed here the Tobacco Control Regulations 2014 made by the Cabinet Secretary for Health published under Legal Notice No. 169 of 2014 in the Kenya Gazette Supplement 161, Legislative Supplement No. 156 of 2014 and scheduled to take effect on 1st June 2015. In a recent development, the High Court has delivered a ruling in the case of British American Tobacco Kenya Ltd v Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Health & 2 others  eKLR ordering that the implementation of these Regulations be temporarily suspended.
British American Tobacco (BAT), the Petitioner, moved the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court under certificate of urgency for various conservatory orders staying the coming into force and implementation and/or operation of the Tobacco Control Regulations 2014. Among BAT’s list of grounds for seeking the conservatory orders, there was a claim that the implementation of certain requirements in the Regulations would result in an infringement of intellectual property (IP) rights held by BAT.
In a recent ruling by the High Court in the case of Riara Group of Schools Limited v Lucas Kimani  eKLR, Ogola J found that Riara had failed to establish a prima facie case against an ex-employee who is alleged to have wilfully and knowingly infringed Riara’s copyright in a learning/revision computer program known as “Digital Genius”. At the heart of the case is the question whether or not a teacher formerly employed at Riara developed a computer program under his contract of service with Riara.
It is interesting to note that while the supporting evidence in Riara’s application clearly establishes an employment relationship which coincides with the period when the ex-employee claims to have developed the computer program, the court held that Riara has not provided any or enough evidence to support its assertion that the: “said computer program was developed using the Plaintiff [Riara]’s resources which included but are not limited to official working hours spent in designing and developing the software, equipment and machinery including computer hardware and electricity. Further, the utility of the said computer program was tested on the Plaintiff School’s pupils and was thereafter fully implemented and used as a teaching aid and revision material in the aforesaid Plaintiff’s School.”
A copy of the ruling is available here.