3, 2, 1: Action as Film Regulation Moves to ICT Ministry

Last month, the President signed Executive Order No. 1 of 2018 on the Organisation of Government which, inter alia, assigned functions and institutions among Ministries and State Departments. One interesting new change in the structure of the Government is that Kenya Film Classification Board (KFCB) and Kenya Film Commission (KFC) are now listed under the State Department for Broadcasting and Telecommunications in the ICT Ministry. In addition the Ministry’s functions now includes overall responsibility for policies on film development in Kenya and the development of the country’s film industry.

This may all seem like a mundane bureaucratic detail but in reality it may well represent a fundamental shift in Kenya’s approach to the development of the creative economy and the important contribution of the film industry. But like every good story, there is a plot twist: the only thing that KFCB and KFC seem to agree on is that they are better off separate than together. Lately, the two lead film agencies have been at loggerheads (see video clips here and here) over how best the film industry should be regulated for the development of this vital pillar of the creative and cultural industries.

Music Royalties and Human Rights: High Court Decision on Copyright Collective Management Cases

 

Endless wrangles in Kenya’s collective management system have made us all experts in copyright law. The thorny question of how and to what extent key players in the collective administration of copyright and related rights must comply with the Constitution remains a hotly debated topic. This brings us to a recent judgment by the High Court in the case of Laban Toto Juma & 4 Others v. Kenya Copyright Board & 2 Others Consolidated Kakamega Petition No. 3B of 2017 delivered on 13 July 2018. A copy of this High Court judgment is available here. Not surprisingly, both sides in this see-saw legal battle are claiming victory following the court’s final verdict. So, this blogpost will attempt to examine the key issues tackled by the court in its judgment as well as some of the questions that have been left unanswered.

CMOs Behaving Badly: Kenya Featured Alongside EU and US Copyright Collecting Societies

The raison d’etre of  the collective administration or collective management system in copyright law is to bridge the gap between rights holders and users of copyright works. So, what happens when collecting societies, or as they are commonly called collective management organisations (CMOs), fail to carry out this core function and instead become poster children for corruption, mismanagement, lack of transparency, and abuse of power?

Back in 2013, Jonathan Band and Brandon Butler published an insightful article titled ‘Some Cautionary Tales About Collective Licensing’ which exposed the dark side of CMOs around the world. This blogger was pleased that some of our work in the context of CMOs in Kenya was featured in the article, specifically the on-going wrangles between Music Copyright Society of Kenya (MCSK) and literally everyone else including the copyright regulator, copyright owners, copyright users and even other Kenyan CMOs in the music industry.

Book Review: Intellectual Property Law in East Africa by Prof. Bakibinga and Dr. Kakungulu

Over the past five years, this blogger has not had the opportunity to write a single book review because no texts on intellectual property (IP) law have been published in the East African region. We now have our very first text to review: “Intellectual Property Law in East Africa” recently published by LawAfrica Ltd and written by David Bakibinga and Ronald Kakungulu, both from Uganda’s Makerere University School of Law.  The description on the back of the book (presumably authored by the publisher) reads in part that: “The text deals primarily with the law relating to intellectual property protection in Uganda (…) Throughout all the chapters reference is made to the corresponding Kenyan and Tanzanian laws and relevant cases in order to give the reader a regional appreciation of the subject. Intellectual Property Law in Uganda is aimed at students pursuing intellectual property law courses in Ugandan and East African Universities as well as peripheral students of intellectual property in the humanities as well as natural,technological and health sciences disciplines. It will also be useful to legal practitioners in the field of intellectual property as a ready reference on the subject.”

As readers may have already noted, the title of the book is confusingly referred to both as “Intellectual Property Law in Uganda” and “Intellectual Property Law in East Africa” on the spine, front cover and back cover of the book. So as not to judge this book by its cover, this blog briefly examines the contents of this 260 paged paperback text to establish whether it is a book on IP Law in Uganda or a book on IP Law in East Africa or something else altogether.

How A Typo Cost Safaricom the “OKOA STIMA” Trade Mark in Favour of Colour Planet

Recently, a leading newspaper published a story here stating that Safaricom Limited had obtained interlocutory orders against Colour Planet Limited stating that the latter was “forbidden from interfering with any contracts Safaricom has under the banner Okoa Stima, suggesting to any third party that Safaricom does not have the right to use the name Okoa Stima.” The rest of the story is filled with several contradictory and confusing facts regarding trade mark searches made, trade mark applications filed and trade mark registrations with respect to the Okoa Stima mark by both Safaricom and Colour Planet.

This blogpost is intended to set the record straight on the specific issue of the chronology of events at the Trade Mark Registry of Kenya Industrial Property Institute (KIPI) involving both Colour Planet and Safaricom between March 2015 and January 2016. For intellectual property (IP) practitioners, this post may also serve as a cautionary tale on the importance of care and caution when handling your clients’ matters pending before KIPI.

Judgment by Court of Appeal Sets Stage for Opposition of “SONY HOLDINGS” Trade Marks

“Like the High Court, we are satisfied that the Registrar judicially and fairly exercised his discretion to extend time. He properly directed himself on the substance of the notice of oppsition so that the matter in controversy may be heard and determined with the benefit of evidence. The alternative, suggested by the appellant, namely to terminate the opposition proceedings on a technical procedural point, would be ineffectual, as the registration of the appellant’s trade marks would open new front of challenge and dispute between the same parties, on essentially the same issue.
We find no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed with costs.” – Githinji, Mwera & Ouko, JJ.A in the Judgment of the Court in Sony Holdings Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks & another [2015] eKLR.

This blogger has come across the recently reported judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Sony Holdings Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks & another [2015] eKLR. As previously discussed here, the so-called Sony case was filed in the High Court to challenge whether the Registrar of Trade Marks acted within his powers in extending time within which a notice of opposition to the registration of two trade marks could be lodged. Disatisfied with the decision of the High Court on this matter, Sony Holdings appealed to the Court of Appeal which has now delivered the present judgment. In its judgment, the appellate court upheld the decision of the High Court and found that the Registrar of Trade Marks had the discretion to extend time periods under Section 21(2) the Trade Marks Act read with Rules 46 and 102 of the Trade Marks Rules.

A copy of the judgment is available here.

Revisiting Registrar’s Ruling in Weetabix v. Multibix Trade Mark Dispute

Recent media reports indicate that United Kingdom-based cereals maker Weetabix Limited has asked the High Court to bar a Kenyan company Manji Food Industries from marketing one of its products—Multibix—arguing that the name infringes on its rights under the law of trade marks and as a result Weetabix has suffered or will suffer loss and damage.

In the suit papers filed at the High Court, Weetabix has reportedly contended that: “Manji Food Industries has put up on the Kenyan market whole grain biscuits not of Weetabix’s manufacture bearing the name Multibix, that is a deceptive imitation of the well-known products of the plaintiff namely Weetabix and Oatibix”

In reply, it reported that Manji has denied the allegations by Weetabix, arguing that the Multibix brand is not intended to confuse consumers of Weetabix’s products and that it is an independent brand with its own following.

The Kenyan cereals manufacturer reportedly contended in its replying affidavit that:

“Manji admits that it manufactures, packs and distributes its product known as Multibix, but denies that it does the same deceptively to imitate Weetabix’s products. Manji denies that it is passing off its product as that of Weetabix or that it has led to confusion”

As many readers may be aware, Weetabix successfully opposed an attempt by Manji to register ‘Multibix’ as a trademark. A copy of the ruling by the Registrar of Trademarks in this matter is available here.

Despite this ruling, it is reported that Manji has continued marketing its product using the Multibix name which Weetabix argues infringes on its well-known trademarks, Weetabix and Oatibix. In this connection, Manji contends that it had lodged an intended appeal against the decision of the Registrar in the opposition proceedings. In reply, Weetabix reportedly asserted that “An intended appeal is not an appeal. An appeal is not in any way a stay of the decision of the registrar and therefore this decision is unchallenged”.

In light of the above, this blogpost revisits some of the salient findings of the Registrar’s ruling in a bid to provide necessary context for Manji’s appeal and Weetabix’s current suit against Manji.

The facts of In Re TMA No. 66428 “MULTIBIX”, Opposition by Weetabix Ltd, 31 August 2012 are briefly that Manji Food Industries Limited lodged an application for registration of trade mark KE/T/2009/066428 “MULTIBIX” (a word mark). The mark was applied for in class 30 in respect of “biscuits”. The Registrar of Trade Marks duly examined the mark in accordance with the provisions of the Trade Marks Act Cap 506 of the Laws of Kenya and the mark was approved and published in the Industrial Property Journal on 30th April 2010 on page 20.

Thereafter, Weetabix Limited filed a Notice of Opposition against registration of the mark. According to the registrar, there were two issues for determination, namely:

1. Is Manji’s mark “MULTIBIX” so similar to the Weetabix’s mark “Weetabix” as to cause a likelihood of confusion in contravention of the provisions of section 14 of the Trade Marks Act?

2. Is Weetabix’s mark “WEETABIX” a well-known mark in Kenya and therefore deserving of protection under section 15A of the Trade Marks Act?

Regarding the first issue, the Registrar relies on the test set out in the American case of Eli Lily & Co v Natural Answers Inc 233, F. 3d 456 to determine whether or not marks are similar. In that case, some of the factors to consider include:
(a) The strength of the complainant’s mark;
(b) Similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion;
(c) The degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers; and
(d) The area and manner of concurrent use of the products.

On the claim of similarity between the marks in appearance, the Registrar makes the following finding:

“The common element between the two marks “WEETABIX” and “MULTIBIX” is the suffix “BIX” which is also a registered mark of the Opponents. The term “BIX” is not an English word and is a creation of the Opponents, which I had earlier indicated that it is a strong mark. The Applicants’ mark is comprised of the word “MULTI” and the said suffix “BIX”. I am therefore of the view that the two marks are similar in appearance.”

In determining the first issue of the opposition proceedings, the Registrar states:

“I disagree with the Applicants when they state that the respective goods of the Opponents and the Applicants are different. It is my view that the goods in respect of which the Opponents have registered their aforementioned marks are goods of the same description as the goods in respect of which the Applicants are seeking to register their mark “MULTIBIX”. This means that both the goods of the Applicants and the Opponents would be sold in the same trade channels thus enhancing the likelihood of confusion or deception. It has long been held that the closer the relationship between particular goods, the more likely any similarity in their respective trade marks would prove deceptive. For this reason, and having held that the marks are similar, then it follows that registration of the Applicants’ mark “MULTIBIX” would be against the provisions of the Trade Marks Act.

Having considered all the relevant factors in regard to similarity of the marks and having considered the two word marks and all the circumstances of these opposition proceedings as stated by Parker J in the aforementioned Pianotist’s Application, I have come to the conclusion that the two marks “WEEETABIX” and “MULTIBIX” are similar and that entry of both marks in the Register of Trade Marks would be a contravention of the provisions of sections 14 and 15(1) of the Trade Marks Act.”

The second and final issue for determination by Registrar was whether “WEETABIX” is a well-known mark in Kenya and therefore deserving protection under the provisions of section 15A of the Act. The Registrar relies on the test for well-known marks set out in the UK case referred to as Oasis Ltd’s Trade Mark Application, where the Court set out the factors to consider namely:
(1) the inherent distinctiveness of the earlier trade mark;
(2) the extent of the reputation that the earlier mark enjoys;
(3) the uniqueness or otherwise of the mark in the market place;
(4) the range of goods or services for which the earlier mark enjoys reputation; and
(5) whether or not the earlier trade mark will be any less distinctive for the goods or services for which it has a reputation than it was before.

In applying the above case, the Registrar arrives at the following finding:

“I am of the view that the Applicants have submitted adequate evidence to indicate that the mark “WEETABIX” has gained such a reputation in the Kenyan market for the mark to be considered well known in Kenya. The said reputation has been gained through promotion and marketing of the said mark on the various media in Kenya and the trade mark “WEETABIX” has come to be only associated with the goods offered for sale by the Opponents.

(….)

In the aforementioned statutory declaration sworn by Richard Martin and filed on behalf of the Opponents, it is indicated that the Opponents’ mark “WEETABIX” together with the aforementioned variants has been registered in numerous jurisdictions of the world. The Opponents have also attached a number of certificates to indicate that their said mark is registered and subsisting in the Register of Trade Marks in the respective jurisdictions. Further, there is an indication as to the various countries where the Applicants’ goods bearing the mark “WEETABIX” have been marketed. In Kenya, the trade mark “WEETABIX” was entered in the Register of Trade Marks with effect from 28th June 1954. This means that the said mark “WEETABIX” has been in the Register of Trade Marks in Kenya for the last fifty-eight (58) years. Further, records at the Registry of Trade Marks indicate that the Opponents have registered several other marks that comprise the suffix “BIX” and which are still subsisting in the Register of Trade Marks.

Further, and as earlier indicated, the mark has been used in the Kenyan market for over thirty (30) years now. In my view, the above-mentioned registrations and use in several jurisdictions including Kenya indicate that the mark is well known. In conclusion and after considering all the relevant factors, it is my opinion that the mark “WEETABIX” is quite well known in Kenya and deserves protection under the provisions of section 15A of the Trade Marks Act.”

As a result, the Registrar found that Weetabix was successful in its opposition of Manji’s application therefore the MULTIBIX application would not proceed to registration. The Registrar also awarded the costs of the opposition proceedings to Weetabix.

With this background in mind, this blogger will be keenly following the developments in the dispute before the High Court.

High Court Orders Stay of Tribunal’s Invalidation of Sanitam Sanitary Bin ARIPO Patent No. 773

In the recent case of Sanitam Services (E A) Ltd v Rentokil (K) Ltd & another (K) Ltd [2014] eKLR, the High Court has issued a stay order against the ruling of the Industrial Property Tribunal (IPT) delivered on 21st January 2014 which invalidated with costs on the higher-scale Sanitam’s Patent Number AP 773 registered with the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) on 15th October 1999.

H.P.G Waweru, J ruled that Sanitam was entitled to the stay pending hearing and determination of its appeal in accordance with section 115 (1) of the Industrial Property Act, 2001 (IPA) which provides –

“(1) Any party to the proceedings before the Tribunal may appeal in accordance with the rules made under this Part from any order or decision of the Tribunal to the High Court..”

In making his ruling, the learned judge examined the effect of invalidation of Sanitam’s patent as provided in Section 104 of the IPA Act, which reads:

“104. Effect of revocation or invalidation

1)Any revoked or invalidated patent, utility model or industrial design or claim or part of a claim of a registered industrial design shall be regarded as null and void from the date of the grant of the patent or certificate of registration of the utility model or the industrial design.

2)As soon as the decision of the Tribunal is no longer subject to appeal, the Chairman of the Tribunal shall inform the Managing Director who shall register and publish it as soon as possible in the Kenya Gazette or in the Industrial Property Journal.”

The court found that the implied effect of s104(2) was that an appeal to the High Court would act as a stay of registration and publication of the decision of the Tribunal in the Kenya Gazette or the Industrial Property Journal. Therefore all Sanitam needed to do was to inform the Chairman of the Tribunal that it had appealed against its order of 21st January 2014 and provide evidence of such appeal.

The court stated as follows:

“Upon a closer look at that wording of section 104(2), there cannot be any doubt that the intention of the legislature was that an appeal once duly lodged, and as long as it remains undisposed of, shall operate as a stay of the decision of the Tribunal, which decision may not be registered or published in the Kenya Gazette or the Industrial Property Journal pending disposal of the appeal.”

However the court allowed Sanitam’s application for a stay as it was necessitated by the fact that the wording of section 104(2) was not express enough and therefore Sanitam made the application ex abundante cautela i.e. out of abundance of caution.

Therefore the focus now shifts to the High Court who will review the decision of the IPT in Nairobi IPT Case No. 5 of 1999. In this matter, Rentokil Initial (K) Limited and Kentainers (K) Limited (the requesters) applied for revocation of the sanitary bin patent by Sanitam (the respondent) on two main grounds:-

1. The subject matter of the invention lacked novelty as it was anticipated by prior art and available for public use. In this regard, the requesters argued that the patent was a mere adaptaion or replica of products which were at the time of grant already in the market in Kenya and elsewhere in the world for a considerable number of years.

2. The subject matter of the invention was obvious and lacked an inventive step.

On its part, the respondent opposed the requesters’ application on the following grounds, as summarised by the IPT:

1. That ARIPO whose mandate extends to Kenya must have considered competing applications or oppositions before registration of the patent in issue.

2. That in spite of the requesters having been notified of the impending application before ARIPO, they did not take any action in opposition thereto and therefore should be stopped from taking the present action.

3. There are no valid grounds in law or in fact to support the present application for revocation.

According to the IPT, several issues arose for determination:

“i) What are the powers of the Tribunal in an application for revocation or infringement
ii) Whether the invalidity of the registration of a patent can be a defence to a claim for infringement
iii) When can the decision of registration of a patent be revoked
iv) What is the test of prior art and what geographical span is applicable”

With respect to (i), (ii) and (iii), we find it curious that the IPT would set out to determine issues that are already clearly provided in the law.

With respect to iv), the IPT stated as follows on the issue of prior art:

“The Applicant [requesters] in their quest to demonstrate that the patent is anticipated by prior art has exhibited other very similar design No. 2042739 in use as far back as 1994. The shape and design of the exhibit is remarkably similar if not the same as the Respondent’s registered patent. The design was demonstrated to be in existence well before the Respondent applied to register the patent.”

However we are puzzled that the IPT failed to conduct any comparison of the respondent’s claims against those of the prior art. In this connection, the IPT also seemed to suggest that the patent examiner ought to have been called by the Respondent to explain whether in light of design No. 2042739 the examiner would still consider the patent as new and not anticipated by prior art. This would be akin to a Magistrate being required to explain his/her decision at the High Court!

Nevertheless, the IPT maintained that it was incumbent upon the respondent to distinguish its patent from the design no. 2042739 and particularly demonstrate an inventive step and research done to rule out existence of prior art.

In this regard, the IPT observed as follows:

“The Respondent seems to argue that the examiner’s decision is what matters and that only an expert can determine the similarity or otherwise of the designs with regard to prior art… They have neither offered any evidence to demonstrate that an attempt was made to establish that the patent was not anticipated by prior art or made any submissions as ordered…The Respondent instead focused their energies and arguments on challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear the matter by filing up to Five (5) applications in the High Court…which were duplications of the same prayers and suffered the similar fate of failure. It was in this diversionary trend that the Respondent probably failed to even file affidavit evidence or submissions in the very matter that mattered most to its patent namely these proceedings.”

From the above, the IPT went on to find that there was indeed evidence that the Respondent’s patent was anticipated by prior art in the form of Design No. 2042739 and that the Respondents failed to demonstrate otherwise.

Although the IPT’s ruling was hard to follow at times and wrought with numerous discussions of irrelevant considerations, the decision to revoke Sanitam sanitary bin patent AP773 is now being heard on appeal before the High Court and we shall update readers on the progress and outcome of the case. In the meantime, our review of the previous cases involving Sanitam’s patent is available here.

Digital Migration Case: Flawed Reasoning by Court of Appeal on Intellectual Property Issues

Signet Kenya Limited, Star Times Media Limited, Pan Africa Network Group Kenya Limited and GOTV Kenya Limited are hereby prohibited from broadcasting any content from Royal Media Services Limited, Nation Media Group Limited and Standard Group Limited without their consent, pending the hearing and determination of the intended appeal. – Ojwang & Wanjala, SCJJ in Communications Commission of Kenya v Royal Media Services Limited & 10 others [2014] eKLR.

There’s an interesting saying about intellectual property (IP) adjudication in Kenya which states that: “most of the time, the outcome may be right but the reasoning is often wrong.” The recent decision by a three-judge bench of the Court of Appeal in the case of Royal Media Services Limited & 2 others v Attorney General & 8 others [2014] eKLR (digital migration case) is a clear illustration of the above saying. Although the matter is currently on appeal before the Supreme Court, this blogpost intends to analyse the reasoning of the Court of Appeal’s majority and minoirty judgments in this matter.

Two out of the three appellate judges (Nambuye and Maraga JJA) set aside the judgment of Majanja, J in the High Court (discussed by this blogger here) and made two IP-related findings in their separate but concurring judgments, namely:-

1. THAT the learned Judge erred in law in holding the Appellants’ intellectual property rights were not violated by the Respondents in broadcasting the Appellants’ programs and content without their consent.

2. THAT the learned Judge erred in law in holding that infringement of intellectual property rights could not be the subject of a constitutional Petition.

It is this blogger’s considered opinion that the above majority view of the Court of Appeal is fundamentally flawed as the Court of Appeal (curiously) arrives at two determinations on IP issues without any reference to any IP legislation.

For instance, the learned appellate judge Nambuye JA at paragraph 91 states that: “I do appreciate that the content both developed and acquired from 3rd parties fits the definition of intellectual property”. To support her position, the judge cites the definition of “property” under the Interpretation and General Provisions Act Cap 2 Laws of Kenya and Article 260 of the Constitution of Kenya.

It is trite that neither Cap 2 nor the Constitution contain a definition of “intellectual property”. The definition of intellectual property depends on the specific subject-matter and the correlated rights which are contained in various pieces of legislation.

In similar fashion, Maraga JA at paragraph 64 states that: “to allow any broadcaster to air FTA programmes of others without their consent amounts to infringement on the IPRs of the owners of those programmes.” However the learned appellate judge does not define and explain which specific intellectual property subject matter and/or specific right(s) in that subject-matter have been violated. In addition, Maraga JA does not set out any accepted test under intellectual property law for infringement.

Despite the Court of Appeal’s flawed reasoning as illustrated above, the outcome of the case is right on the issue of IP infringement. From an intellectual property perspective, all broadcasts are recognised as a category of copyright works under section 22(1). Therefore broadcasters are recognised as holders of neighbouring/related rights under copyright law, like producers and performers. Broadcasters have the right to authorize or prohibit the following acts as defined in the Copyright Act:
(a) Rebroadcasting of their broadcasts
(b) Fixation of their broadcasts;
(c) Reproduction of such fixations;
(d) Communication to the public of their television broadcasts if such communication is made in places accessible to the public against payment of an entrance fee

Section 35(1) provides that if any of the above acts are done by any person without the authority of the broadcaster, the latter’s rights under copyright are infringed. Subsection 4 of this section provides that infringement is actionable at the suit of the rights holder (assignee or exclusive licensee as the case may be) and the latter may be entitled to a wide array of reliefs including damages, injunction, accounts, delivery up, reasonable royalty, among others.
For this reason alone, this blogger agrees with Majanja J’s reasoning in the High Court that IP infringement claims cannot be the subject of a constitutional petition.

This blogger will continue to keenly monitor and update readers on the developments in this matter as it is heard by the Supreme Court.

2013 Year in Review: Intellectual Property in Kenya

2013 was an election year for Kenya which resulted in the swearing in of Uhuru Kenyatta as the fourth President of the Republic. Kenyatta has been very supportive of the creative economy and has on several occasions reiterated his administration’s commitment to creating a conducive environment for creators to reap from their intellectual property (IP) assets. However, Kenyatta’s mark on IP this year was the decision to reform all state corporations and parastatals in Kenya which has set in motion plans to merge the copyright office, the industrial property office and the anti-counterfeit agency into one national IP office.

Copyright and Related Rights

In 2013, copyright news was monopolized by Safaricom which was embroiled with two high profile copyright cases with Faulu Kenya and JB Maina. Another popular copyright story was Longhorn’s acquisition of publishing rights for iconic educational textbooks writer, Malkiat Singh.

The year was also memorable for Kenya as she successfully negotiated and signed the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who are BIlind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled.

Industrial Property

In 2013, trade marks stole the show with several far reaching rulings by the Registrar of Trademarks as well as the landmark acquisition of a local trademark by a multinational cosmetics company. In addition, trademark administration has continued to be the major revenue earner for the national IP office, Kenya Industrial Property Institute (KIPI) especially through the Madrid System.

The Red Bull case (available online) was an important decision in that it expanded the Kenyan IP jurisprudence in respect of the doctrines of “conceptual similarity” and “well-known marks”.

In the Basmati case, a clear distinction was drawn between trade marks and geographical indications within the context of Kenya’s international obligations under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of IP (TRIPs) adopted in section 40A of the Kenya Trademarks Act.

In the Pyrex case (available online), the Registrar found that the withdrawal of a threat of opposition does not amount to a surrender of your rights to institute cancellation proceedings in respect of the same trade mark. This ruling was important because it provides a practical application of two amended provisions of the Act, namely Section 36A and 36B of the Act.

Later in the year, one of the largest cosmetics companies in the world, L’Oréal fully acquired the health and beauty divisions of local firm, Interconsumer Products Ltd, makers of Nice & Lovely brands, in a multi-billion shilling transaction. This acquisition is seen as part of L’Oreal’s push to dominate the East Africa’s low-end cosmetic market.

Legislative Developments

As previously discussed here, several amendments have been proposed to the Copyright and the Anti Counterfeit Acts in the Statute Law Miscellaneous Bill currently before Parliament is passed. Earlier this year, a proposed draft law on the protection of traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions was validated.

This year saw the enactment of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, Consumer Protection Act, Media Council of Kenya Act and Kenya Information and Communication Amendment Act, all of which will affect IP administration and enforcement both directly and indirectly.

For more stories from 2013, check out the IPKenya archive on the right hand side of this page and information from other sites on our twitter feed.

See you all in 2014!